Review of \u3cem\u3eThe \u27Eudemian Ethics\u27 on the Voluntary, Friendship, and Luck: The Sixth S.V. Keeling Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy\u3c/em\u3e by Fiona Leigh by Maher, Daniel P.
Digital Commons @ Assumption University 
Philosophy Department Faculty Works Philosophy Department 
2013 
Review of The 'Eudemian Ethics' on the Voluntary, Friendship, and 
Luck: The Sixth S.V. Keeling Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy by 
Fiona Leigh 
Daniel P. Maher 
Assumption College, dmaher@assumption.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.assumption.edu/philosophy-faculty 
 Part of the Philosophy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Maher, D. P. (2013). Review of The 'Eudemian Ethics' on the Voluntary, Friendship, and Luck: The Sixth S.V. 
Keeling Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy by Fiona Leigh. Bryn Mawr Classical Review: 
https://www.bmcreview.org/2013/07/20130716.html. 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy Department at Digital Commons @ 
Assumption University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Department Faculty Works by an 
authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Assumption University. For more information, please contact 
digitalcommons@assumption.edu. 
9/5/2018 Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2013.07.16
http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2013/2013-07-16.html 1/4
BMCR 2013.07.16 on the BMCR blog
 
Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2013.07.16
Fiona Leigh (ed.), The 'Eudemian Ethics' on the Voluntary, Friendship,
and Luck: The Sixth S.V. Keeling Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy.
Philosophia Antiqua, 132.   Leiden; Boston:  Brill, 2012.  Pp. xxix, 197.
 ISBN 9789004225367.  $144.00.   
 
 
Reviewed by Daniel P. Maher, Assumption College (dmaher@assumption.edu)
 
Preview
The Sixth S.V. Keeling Colloquium was organized by Robert Heinaman and held in 2006
at University College London (“2005” on page xxiv appears to be a slip). In 2009, Brill
published papers from the Seventh Keeling Colloquium (Particulars in Greek
Philosophy, ed. R. W. Sharples), and it is not clear why this collection from the earlier
colloquium did not appear until 2012. Whatever may have delayed the book, its arrival is
most welcome. The essays contained here will surely stimulate interest in the Eudemian
Ethics (hereafter“EE”), which has recently been translated and published in complete
form for the first time twice, as it were, by Anthony Kenny in 2011 (Oxford) and by Brad
Inwood and Raphael Woolf in 2013 (Cambridge). In the volume under review, each of
the five essays targets an important but relatively circumscribed issue, and together they
should convince anyone of the desirability of fresh and serious investigation of the EE.
To varying degrees, these essays explore differences between Aristotle’s Eudemian and
Nicomachean texts, and they do so primarily “from the bottom up”, i.e. on the basis of
close textual analysis rather than on the basis of claims that a distinctive or integrated
“Eudemian” project somehow leads Aristotle to positions that differ from what we find
in the Nicomachean Ethics (hereafter “NE”). Indeed, apart from a quick sketch in the
introduction (by Fiona Leigh and Brad Inwood), there is little effort toward a
comprehensive view of EE, and certainly the essays do not pretend to “cover” the whole
text. Instead, we have one essay on the voluntary, one on good will in friendship, two on
self-sufficiency and friendship, and one on good fortune in relation to excellence and
happiness. The two essays on self-sufficiency are periodically engaged with one another,
but otherwise the papers show no signs of belonging to the same colloquium. They are
published without the professional responses that were provided at the colloquium.
The center of gravity in this volume is established by the two essays treating self-
sufficiency and friendship: “With Mirrors or Without? Self-Perception in Eudemian
Ethics VII.12”, by Mary Margaret McCabe, and “The Pleasure of Thinking Together:
Prolegomenon to a Complete Reading of EE VII.12”, by Jennifer Whiting. Each
provides a detailed reading of Aristotle’s aporia concerning whether the self-sufficient
human being will have friends. Whereas McCabe sees Aristotle asserting “man’s failure
to be self-sufficient” (53) and emphasizing the joint activity of friendship as properly
human, in distinction from the best divine life (64), Whiting argues that such a reading
removes rather than solves the aporia because it makes a friend necessary for achieving
9/5/2018 Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2013.07.16
http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2013/2013-07-16.html 2/4
one’s end. According to Whiting, the self-sufficient agent takes pleasure in the
“experiences and actions of her friend”, and this pleasure (rather than any genuine need)
explains why she wants to live and act with friends. Yet this does not become a
friendship on account of pleasure (dia hêdonên) because the pleasure in question is the
pleasure proper to virtue (81). In a later passage, Whiting seems to reformulate her view:
these are friends primarily on account of virtue but also on account of pleasure (99-100).
It is fascinating to follow two opposed, careful readings of this troubled and troublesome
text.
To return for a moment to McCabe’s essay: she understands Aristotle to be making a
teleological argument according to which human fulfillment lies in a kind of self-
awareness attainable only in common with a friend. The requisite self- perception is not
simply the “natural and immediate accompaniment of first-order perceiving” (68); that
happens without effort. Nor is this self-perception achieved merely by observing a friend
in actuality and as analogous to oneself; that might be the picture given in NE. According
to McCabe, in EE Aristotle gives a more radical view of individual insufficiency to attain
the human end. “God may be alone, but we are not: instead, in the best case, we actualise
together with our friends” (64). Only in friendship, in “genuinely joint activity” (70), is it
possible to perceive the self precisely as perceiving in a peculiar sense: not as a private
awareness one friend achieves in parallel with another, but as a joint, reflective
perception in a self that is somehow composed of both friends (73).
Whiting offers an alternative interpretation of the same text. In fact, she sees herself as
undertaking two interdependent tasks: “that of establishing what text to read and that of
making sense of this portion of the text as a whole” (82). Whiting reads EE VII.12 as a
partial response to the Philebus and as best understood in light of Metaphysics XII,
chapters 7 and 9, and Aristotle’s doctrine from De Anima according to which “perceiving
some object involves in some sense becoming like the object” (141 n. 110, Whiting’s
italics). The connection with De Anima is central but less fully developed than is the
connection with Metaphysics. Whiting offers a division of the text and proceeds through
it sequentially, discussing textual variants, providing a translation, and defending her
interpretation. Once she begins parsing the text, it is no longer possible to read this as an
ordinary essay; one must study it closely to follow her thorough consideration of an array
of textual and interpretive possibilities. The result is demanding, but not quite
bewildering. And there is no reason to blame Whiting for the complexity here; her paper
is remarkable for its clarity. Nevertheless, it probably would have been helpful to present
the text and translation in their entirety (whether at the beginning or in an appendix). At
least this would facilitate comprehension when Whiting discusses one passage in relation
to one or more other passages, which, as things stand, requires frequent flipping, now
forward and now backward, to identify the texts in question.
Whiting’s essay tips the scales at nearly eighty pages and will likely become a reference
point for future scholarship on Aristotle’s view of friendship. It certainly deserves that
sort of prominence because of her patient analysis of conjectural readings and alternative
interpretations. It is not quite clear to what she considers this a “prolegomenon”:
although she does leave some questions open, there is little that is tentative about her
reading. Her textual reconstruction, translation, and interpretation form an impressive
and valuable scholarly achievement. On more than one occasion in the Cambridge
edition of EE, Inwood and Woolf note their indebtedness to discussions with her. Still, it
would be unfortunate if her essay were to eclipse McCabe’s, which presents an
interpretation of “self-perception” that, even if it remains somewhat obscure, is more
intriguing than the view of friendship to be found in Whiting’s reading. On McCabe’s
view, union with a friend is utterly unlike anything else, but Whiting has an
individualistic view of koinônia (135) and speaks of friends as “common objects of
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human perceiving and knowing” (124; cf. 89), as if a friend were little more than one of
the pleasant objects lying in one’s field of awareness. McCabe displays greater
sensitivity to the phenomena that led Aristotle to devote so much attention to friendship,
and it would have been nice to see McCabe’s essay expanded to eighty pages as well.
Christopher Rowe’s essay, “Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics on Loving People and Things”,
concentrates on good will (eunoia), which he understands (following Sarah Broadie’s
analysis of good will in NE) to have two possible senses. In the wide sense, good will
involves “wishing good for another for his own sake” in the sense that one wishes what
is genuinely good for someone, as distinct from merely wishing that the person be able to
serve some advantage for oneself. In the narrow sense, good will involves “wishing good
for another for his own sake” in the sense that one has this good will on account of who
this person is and not due to some incidental feature of the person. The latter sense is
clearly found in EE, and is proper to the primary form of friendship. Rowe’s concern is
to establish that in EE also, despite some indications to the contrary, Aristotle
understands good will in the broader sense as integral to each of the three canonical
senses of friendship. The key text is found in EE VII.7, in relation to which Rowe
develops the distinction between loving the useful and pleasant things attainable from
others and actually having good will for a person who is useful or pleasant. He then goes
on to investigate how Aristotle understands it to be possible for one person to love
another on account of that other person’s excellence, which brings him to a brief
consideration of the same themes occupying McCabe and Whiting.
The first essay in this book is “The Eudemian Ethics on the ‘Voluntary,’” by David
Charles, who contrasts Aristotle’s analysis of to hekousion in EE with what we find in
NE and with what is meant in ordinary English by voluntary. He argues that, according
to the doctrine in NE, the term hekousion should not be translated as “voluntary” because
Aristotle extends his term more widely (including actions performed under coercion)
than is customary with the English term. Accordingly, Charles uses asterisks around the
word voluntary (like so: *voluntary*) in order to indicate when he uses it as Aristotle
uses hekousion in the two texts (a device that is not followed with perfect consistency:
see 11). According to Charles, in EE “nature” figures prominently while “choice” is
absent, but the reverse is true in NE. He works out the details of Aristotle’s two
treatments, arguing that in EE the agent or the agent’s nature is conceived as “the sole
and complete controller” of those actions that qualify as *voluntary*, whereas in NE
agents have more limited control over their *voluntary* actions. Charles also tries to
negotiate the differences between EE and NE on this score by reference to chapter eight
of the common book NE V.
Friedemann Buddensiek’s essay, “Does Good Fortune Matter? Eudemian Ethics on
Eutuchia”, is the most difficult essay to summarize and evaluate. Aristotle’s text in EE
VIII.2 could be described as dialectical, but also as evasive or even cryptic, and
Buddensiek is willing to introduce features for which he finds no textual warrant.
Buddensiek takes certain theses from the text as fixed points of reference (good fortune
is non-rational, good fortune is somehow natural, those with good fortune have impulses
that lead to success, and so on) and works through the logical possibilities for piecing
together “what Aristotle may have thought” (179) about the relationship between good
fortune and happiness. According to Buddensiek, good fortune does matter “insofar as it
makes it easier to obtain some of those external goods that are required for eudaimonia”
(160). Good fortune is consistent with and even conducive of happiness, but it is not
essential for it. He articulates a sense of good fortune that is rooted in the nature of the
individual, independent of gods and luck, but still we have no reason to think good
fortune is closely connected with natural excellence although it is closely connected with
virtuous actions (176–80).
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A few words on the nuts and bolts of publication: There are almost no typographical
errors (none of any apparent consequence), except in the essay by David Charles, where
numerous mistakes, all of which seem insignificant, give the impression of unusual
carelessness. A bibliography accompanies each essay, and there is a general index and a
very helpful index of passages cited.
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